• Positive vs Normative Statements - Economics
  • What's the difference between empirical and normative…
  • What's the difference between empirical and normative

In law, as an academic discipline, the term "normative" is used to describe the way something ought to be done according to a value position

LEGAL POSITIVISM and NATURAL LAW THEORY ..

Positive vs. Normative--Is falsification required?

EJLT - European Journal of Law and Technology
Habermas's rejection of the explanatory holism of the first generationof the Frankfurt School has both explanatory and normativeimplications. First, he brings categories of meaning and agency backinto critical social theory, both of which were absent in themacro-sociological and depth psychological approaches that werefavored in the post war period. This brings democratic potentials backinto view, since democracy makes sense only within specific forms ofinteraction and association, from the public forum to variouspolitical institutions. Indeed, Habermas's first and perhaps mostenduring work, The Structural Transformation of the PublicSphere (Habermas 1989/1961), traced the historical emergence ofnew forms of public interaction from the intimate sphere of thefamily, to coffee houses, salons, and finally to parliamentarydebates. While linked ultimately to a narrative of its declinethrough the market and the administrative state, the core of suchinteraction and the critical and egalitarian potential of being partof a public whose members address one another as equals had forHabermas a nonideological, even “utopian” core (Habermas1989, 88). Second, Habermas also developed an alternative sociology ofmodernity, in which social differentiation and pluralization are notpathological but positive features of modern societies (Habermas 1982,1986). Indeed, the positive conception of complexity permits ananalysis of the ways in which modern societies and their functionaldifferentiation opens up democratic forms of self-organizationindependently of some possible expressively integrated totality. Suchan ideal of an expressive totality and conscious self control over theproduction of the conditions of social life is replaced with publicityand mutual recognition within feasible discursive institutions.

Autonomy: Normative | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy


This book describes the encounter between the common law legal system and the tribal peoples of North America and Australasia. It is a history of the role of anglophone law in managing relations between the British settlers and indigenous peoples. That history runs from the plantation of Ireland and settlement of the New World to the end of the 20th century. The book begins by looking at the nature of British imperialism and the position of non-Christian peoples at large in the 17th and 18th centuries. It then focuses on North America and Australasia from their early national periods in the 19th century to the modern era. The historical basis of relations is described through the key, enduring, but constantly shifting questions of sovereignty, status and, more latterly, self-determination. Throughout the history of engagement with common law legalism, questions surrounding the settler-state's recognition — or otherwise — of the integrity of the tribe have recurred. These issues were addressed in many and varied imperial and colonial contexts, but all jurisdictions have shared remarkable historical parallels which have been accentuated by their common legal heritage. The same questioning continues today in the renewed and controversial claims of the tribal societies to a distinct constitutional position and associated rights of self-determination. The author examines the political resurgence of aboriginal peoples in the last quarter of the 20th century. A period of ‘rights-recognition’ was transformed into a second-generation jurisprudence of rights-management and rights-integration. From the 1990s onwards, aboriginal affairs have been driven by an increasingly rampant legalism.

 

Law, Philosophy of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy


This book describes the encounter between the common law legal system and the tribal peoples of North America and Australasia. It is a history of the role of anglophone law in managing relations between the British settlers and indigenous peoples. That history runs from the plantation of Ireland and settlement of the New World to the end of the 20th century. The book begins by looking at the nature of British imperialism and the position of non-Christian peoples at large in the 17th and 18th centuries. It then focuses on North America and Australasia from their early national periods in the 19th century to the modern era. The historical basis of relations is described through the key, enduring, but constantly shifting questions of sovereignty, status and, more latterly, self-determination. Throughout the history of engagement with common law legalism, questions surrounding the settler-state's recognition — or otherwise — of the integrity of the tribe have recurred. These issues were addressed in many and varied imperial and colonial contexts, but all jurisdictions have shared remarkable historical parallels which have been accentuated by their common legal heritage. The same questioning continues today in the renewed and controversial claims of the tribal societies to a distinct constitutional position and associated rights of self-determination. The author examines the political resurgence of aboriginal peoples in the last quarter of the 20th century. A period of ‘rights-recognition’ was transformed into a second-generation jurisprudence of rights-management and rights-integration. From the 1990s onwards, aboriginal affairs have been driven by an increasingly rampant legalism.


India’s post-TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) patent law reforms, which incorporates a remarkable array of flexibilities is seen as a counter-harmonization measure in direct opposition to the dominant model of patent law pioneered by the United States. India’s response, which represents an alternative model of confirming to the TRIPS Agreement, has seen stiff resistance in the form of counter-provisions in Free Trade Agreements entered by the US and other countries. Historically, patent systems based on neo-liberalism, like the American model, favour individual pursuits whereas patent systems based on social democracy, like the Indian model, focus on community goals. This distinction manifests in the manner in which the role of the public is defined in the patent system. India’s model is characterized by the emphasis on the public elements in three significant ways. First, in redefining pre-grant opposition by allowing public participation in questioning the ex ante validity of patents. Second, in protecting the public domain by heightening the standard of patentability and requiring the patent applicant to demonstrate technical advance and greater effectiveness of the invention. Third, in providing for compulsory licensing when the public interest is affected by a patent that is not worked locally. The influence of the India’s model has come from mimicry by other countries in following the Indian example. Countries like Argentina, Philippines, Brazil, China, and South Africa have either emulated or strongly favour following India’s path. Such state practices might occasion the reimagination of the TRIPS Agreement as the Access Regime.


The Norm of Self-Interest - Stanford University

The definition of freedom as a triadic relation was first put forwardin the seminal work of Felix Oppenheim in the 1950s and 60s. Oppenheimsaw that an important meaning of ‘freedom’ in the contextof political and social philosophy was as a relation between twoagents and a particular (impeded or unimpeded) action. Thisinterpretation of freedom remained, however, what Berlin would call anegative one. What MacCallum did was to generalize this triadicstructure so that it would cover all possible claims about freedom,whether of the negative or the positive variety. In MacCallum'sframework, unlike in Oppenheim's, the interpretation of each of thethree variables is left open. In other words, MacCallum's position isa meta-theoretical one: his is a theory about the differences betweentheorists of freedom.

The Norm of Self-Interest Dale T

The shift in the Frankfurt School to such external forms ofcriticism from 1940 onwards is not confined to the fascist state. Withthe development of capitalism in its monopoly form, the liberalheritage loses its rational potential as the political sphereincreasingly functionalized to the market and its reified socialrelationships. In this way the critique of liberalism shifts away fromthe normative underpinnings of current democratic practices to the waysin which the objective conditions of reification undermine thepsychological and cultural presuppositions of democratic change andopposition. Such a society is now a “wholly false totality.” Thework of Adorno and Horkheimer in this period shows the philosophicalconsequences of this shift, especially in Dialectic ofEnlightenment (1944) and The Eclipse of Reason(1947).